Perspectives on cost-effectiveness thresholds in the United States

Moderated by:

- Dr. Steven Pearson, President
- Dr. Rick Chapman, Director of Health Economics



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Webinar 2: Willingness to pay as a basis for a costeffectiveness threshold in the United States

Main Presentation:



Christopher McCabe, BA, MSc, PhD CEO and Executive Director Institute of Health Economics (IHE)



Using per capita GDP and/or individual surveys to determine a specific threshold range in the US

INSTITUTE OF HEALTH ECONOMICS ALBERTA CANADA Dr. Christopher McCabe July 24, 2019 ICER Webinar Series

THE

Demand (v) and Supply Side (k) Thresholds



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Demand side threshold (v) in the US



- Health insurance is an employment benefit
 - An imperfect expression of individual value of health
- Health insurance receives a tax credit
 - Impacts on disposable income
 - Impacts upon public funds available for other activities
 - Promotes income inequality in access to health care
 - Promotes inefficiency in production of health (inverse care law).





 What private health insurance is willing to cover does not provide insight into the normative question of what health insurance should cover as an expression of the preferences of Americans.



Criterion (Cost per DALY)	Definition	Implied US Threshold (2017 data)
Less than One times GDP	Very cost effective	< \$59,532
Between One and Three times GDP	Cost effective	< = \$178,596
Greater than Three times GDP	Not cost effective	> \$178,596



WHO-CHOICE GDP Thresholds

Policy & practice

Thresholds for the cost–effectiveness of interventions: alternative approaches

Elliot Marseille,^a Bruce Larson,^b Dhruv S Kazi,^c James G Kahn^d & Sydney Rosen^b

Abstract Many countries use the cost–effectiveness thresholds recommended by the World Health Organization's Choosing Interv that are Cost–Effective project (WHO-CHOICE) when evaluating health interventions. This project sets the threshold for cost–effect as the cost of the intervention per disability-adjusted life-year (DALY) averted less than three times the country's annual gross de product (GDP) per capita. Highly cost–effective interventions are defined as meeting a threshold per DALY averted of once the GDP per capita. We argue that reliance on these thresholds reduces the value of cost–effectiveness analyses and makes such analy blunt to be useful for most decision-making in the field of public health. Use of these thresholds has little theoretical justification, sl difficult but necessary ranking of the relative values of locally-applicable interventions and omits any consideration of what is truly affe The WHO-CHOICE thresholds set such a low bar for cost–effectiveness that very few interventions with evidence of efficacy can k out. The thresholds have little value in assessing the trade-offs that decision-makers must confront. We present alternative approa applying cost–effectiveness criteria to choices in the allocation of health-care resources.

Bulletin of the World Health Organization

Policy & practice

Cost–effectiveness thresholds: pros and cons



Melanie Y Bertram^a, Jeremy A Lauer^a, Kees De Joncheere^a, Tessa Edejer^a, Raymond Hutubessy^a, Marie-Paule Kieny^a & Suzanne R Hill^a

a. World Health Organization, avenue Appia 20, 1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland.

Correspondence to Melanie Y Bertram (email: bertramm@who.int).

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WHO-CHOICE GDP Thresholds

Definition	Implied US Threshold (2017 data)
Very Cost Effective	< \$59,532
Cost Effective	< = \$178,596
Not Cost Effective	> \$178,596
	DefinitionVery Cost EffectiveCost EffectiveNot Cost Effective

Criticisms

- Arbitrary there is no normative justification for these thresholds
- Insensitive to:
 - affordability
 - local priorities
 - (in)efficiency of the local health care system
- Divorced from consideration of non-health calls on available resources
- Unhelpful problematic technologies likely meet these thresholds

"Given the evidence suggesting that \$50,000 per QALY is too low in the United States, it might best be thought of as an implied lower boundary. Instead, we would recommend that analysts use \$50,000, \$100,000, and \$200,000 per QALY. If one had to select a single threshold outside the context of an explicit resource constraint or opportunity cost, we suggest using either \$100,000 or \$150,000." Neumann et al NEJM, 2014.



Stated Preference WTP for Health

HEALTH ECONOMICS

Health Econ. **24**: 1289–1301 (2015) Published online 28 July 2014 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). E

L. RYEN AND M. SVENSSON

Table I. List of included studies

THE WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR A QUALI A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICA

LINDA RYEN^{a,*} and MIKAEL SVE

^aDepartment of Economics, Karlstad University, ^bDepartment of Economics, Örebro University,

ABSTRACT

There has been a rapid increase in the use of cost-effectiveness analysis, outcome measure, in evaluating both medical technologies and public hea literature on the monetary value of a QALY based on estimates of the wireview of the literature on the WTP for a QALY. In total, 24 studies con QALY are identified. Trimmed mean and median estimates amount to 74,1 tively. In regression analyses, the results indicate that the WTP for a QALY from life extension rather than quality of life improvements. The results also no the size of the QALY gain valued. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & S

Received 7 October 2013; Revised 5 May 2014; Accepted 20 June 2014

Author(s) and year of publication	Country	Total sample size
Blumenschein and Johannesson (1998)	USA	69
Johannesson and Meltzer (1998)	SWE	_
Zethraeus (1998)	SWE	104
Cunningham and Hunt (2000)	UK	40
Hirth et al. (2000)	Several	_
Gyrd-Hansen (2003)	DEN	3201
Byrne et al. (2005)	USA	193
King et al. (2005)	USA	391
Mason et al. (2009)	UK	
Lieu et al. (2009)	USA	478
Pinto-Prades et al. (2009)	ESP	892
Bobinac <i>et al.</i> (2010)	NED	1091
Shiroiwa et al. (2010)	AUS, JPN, KOR, TWN, UK, <mark>USA</mark>	5500
Bobinac et al. (2012)	NED	1091
Baker et al. (2010)	UK	409
Haninger and Hammitt (2011)	USA	2858
Zhao et al. (2011)	CHN	632
Bobinac et al. (2013)	NED	1004
Gyrd-Hansen and Kjær (2012)	DEN	1724
Thavorncharoensap et al. (2013)	THA	1191
Pennington et al. (2013)	NED, UK, FRA, ESP, SWE, NOR, DEN, POL, HUN	17,657
Robinson et al. (2013)	NED, UK, FRA, ESP, SWE, NOR, DEN, POL, HUN	21,896
Shiroiwa et al. (2013)	JPN	2283
Bobinac et al. (2014)	NED	1004



Table II. Included stated preferences :

Stated Preference WTP for Health

Table IV. Included studies-estimates of willingness to pay for a quality adjusted life year in 2010 Euros

	Individual or	Gapor			Range of	festimates	
Author(s)	social perspective	p	Author(s)	No. of estimates in paper	Lowest estimate	Highest estimate	Mean estimate
Blumenschein and	Individual	1	Blumenschein and Johannesson (1998)	2	7339	48,228	27,783
Johannesson (1998)			Johannesson and Meltzer (1998)	3	79,790	453,969	241,812
Zethraeus (1998)	Individual	1	Zethraeus (1998)	2	14,632	19,291	16,961
Cunningham and Hunt (2000)	Individual	1	Cunningham and Hunt (2000)	1	741	741	741
Gyrd-Hansen (2003)	Individual	(Hirth <i>et al.</i> (2000)	41	21,815	1,204,963	294,017
Byrne et al. (2005)	Individual	(Gyrd-Hansen (2003)	2	11,892	14,121	13,007
King $et al.$ (2005)	Individual	6	Byrne <i>et al.</i> (2005)	9	1134	5284	3163
Lien <i>et al.</i> (2009)	Individual	1	King <i>et al.</i> (2005)	12	11,174	28,785	20,799
Pinto-Prades et al. (2009)	Individual	i	Mason <i>et al.</i> (2009)	12	32,319	94,606	66,056
Bobinac <i>et al.</i> (2010)	Individual		Lieu <i>et al.</i> (2009)	9	22,448	38,852	32,041
Shirojwa at al. (2010)	Both		Pinto-Prades <i>et al.</i> (2009)	37	4654	125,588	30,843
Bobinoo at al. (2010)	Individual		Bobinac <i>et al.</i> (2010)	4	9838	25,108	16,627
Bolian et al. (2012)	Individual		Baker <i>et al.</i> (2010)	2	20,958	26,518	23,738
Baker <i>et al.</i> (2010)	Individual		Shiroiwa <i>et al.</i> (2010)	24	20,682	75,813	45,376
Haninger and Hammitt (2011)	Individual		Bobinac <i>et al.</i> (2010)	29	1231	21,959	9389
Zhao <i>et al.</i> (2011)	Individual	1	Haninger and Hammitt (2011)	27	132,335	4,864,167	892,065
Bobinac <i>et al.</i> (2013)	Societal	(Zhao et al. (2011)	4	36/1	5693	4/60
Gyrd-Hansen and Kjær (2012)	Individual	(Bobinac <i>et al.</i> (2013)	0	51,006	184,578	92,533
Thavorncharoensap et al. (2013)	Individual	(Gyrd-Hansen and Kjær (2012)	14	3040	107,688	38,844
Pennington et al. (2013)	Individual	(Thavorncharoensap <i>et al.</i> (2013)	24	633	6934	1922
Robinson et al. (2013)	Individual	(Pennington <i>et al.</i> (2013)	15	6266	23,049	12,210
Shiroiwa et al. (2013)	Individual	(Robinson <i>et al.</i> (2013)	80	/841	43,279	20,161
Bobinac et al. (2014)	Individual	(Smroiwa et al. (2013)	10	15,597	//,980	42,499
			Bobinac et al. (2014)	8	54,132	244,768	114,665

Shiroiwa et al (2010) Mean = @ US \$60,000.



WTP_{VSL} per QALY: 40 years life expectancy VSL= \$3,000,000

Table V. Mean (standard errors) and median estimates of willingness to pay for a quality adjusted life year in 2010 Euros

	All estimates	SP estimates	SP estimates excluding Haninger and Hammitt	VSL estimates
Mean Median Trimmed mean	118,839 (19,120) 24,226 74,159	97,683 (21,339) 20,622 49,778	26,189 (1,636) 19,196 23.721	242,371 (35,786) 109,858 228,630
SP, stated preference	; VSL, value of statistical life			

 WTP_{VSL} per QALY = @ 2010 US \$300,000



WTP_{VSL} per QALY: 40 years life expectancy VSL= \$3,000,000

From Ryen & Svennson (2015)

$$VSL = \sum_{t=0}^{n} \frac{q_t + A\lambda}{(1+i)^t}$$

- A = Average age of population t=0
- t = time
- n = life expectancy
- i = discount rate
- $\lambda = WTP$



Table V. Mean (standard errors) and median estimates of willingness to pay for a quality adjusted life year in 2010 Euros

	All estimates	SP estimates	SP estimates excluding Haninger and Hammitt	VSL estimates
WTP _{VSL} pe	r QALY = 20	010 @ US \$30	00,000	
Trimmed mean	74,159	49,778	23.721	228,630

SP, stated preference; VSL, value of statistical life.

Challenges

- Mean age, life expectancy and quality of life of covered population will vary by:
 - State
 - Payer
 - Socio-economic characteristics of the covered population
- Payers covering the most sickly populations will likely have highest thresholds affordability
- Payers covering the healthiest populations will likely have lowest threshold acceptability
- Is the demand for health all that is being expressed via health care reimbursementt eg demand for innovation, equality, solidarity etc...?



- There is no off-the-shelf estimate of a US WTP for Health
- There is no consistent model of whose WTP for what in the published literature

For Discussion:

- 1. What would be ICER's objective in adopting a WTP/Threshold value?
- 2. Can we specify WTP question(s) that would be coherent with that objective?
 - 1. What would be the appropriate perspective for the question?
 - 2. How would we describe the objective(s) to respondents
- 3. Who would be the appropriate population to be surveyed?
- 4. Given ICER's objective:
 - 1. Is a VSL approach either feasible or appropriate?
 - 2. Is a DCE approach either feasible or appropriate?
 - 3. Can an implied WTP be extracted from revealed preferences for insurance coverage?





cmccab	e@i	he.ca
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1.780.448.4881



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Discussion

Responders: Jens Grueger, David Meltzer, Lou Garrison

Garrison Comments on WTP as Basis for Threshold and GDP per Capita/Surveys as Methods (1)

- WTP is a reasonable approach to thinking about thresholds in a consumer sovereigntybased (welfarist; NOT extra-welfarist) system.
- Value varies across individuals, across indications for the same medicine, and dynamically over time.
- In theory, we could use contingent valuation to get incremental insurance premium, but it's impractical. The QALY is a useful pragmatic work-around.
- Per our recent ISPOR Special Task Force on Value Assessment Frameworks, the QALY as the core measure of value is a reasonable starting point.
- It's important to recognize that innovative (patented) medicines are unique medicoeconomic goods—with global public good properties.
- QALY-based modeling works better for medicines than for other medical inputs such as physician and hospital care, which constitute the bulk of the spending.
- Although the QALY is a good starting point for the health gain, it has limitations including using mean treatment effects and ignoring the value of reducing uncertainty.

Garrison Comments on WTP as Basis for Threshold and GDP per Capita/Surveys as Methods (2)

- The STF identified a number of potential novel elements of value that could be used in augmented CEA: insurance value, value of hope, real option value, value of knowing, severity of disease, and fear of contagion.
- Other system-level factors can also affect value beyond the QALY: equity and scientific spillovers. Regarding GDP per capita and surveys, specifically:
- GDP per capita/income
 - Can be a useful variable for global differential pricing across countries.
 - In the U.S., income is relevant, but WTP varies with income.
 - Phelps (2019) shows how income would affect the threshold.
 - GDP per capita would mix those can afford to pay something and those who can't. A "median voter rule" for this mixed population would give an different answer than among those who can afford to pay some amount.
 - Budget constraint (and hence threshold) for Medicaid (and Medicare?) is based on **willingness to redistribute** of the income-earning well-off population.
 - De facto, we have at least two thresholds already.
 - In U.S. market-based system, there is a case (Pauly, 2017) for multiple thresholds.
- Stated preference
 - Contingent valuation is not that useful here, due to insurance and very low incremental premium cost.

Next webinar:

Fri, Jul 26, 2019 3:00 PM - 4:00 PM EDT

Webinar 3: Willingness to pay Part 2: Using past funding decisions, value of a statistical life, and relative risk aversion as the basis for determining a cost-effectiveness threshold in the US

Hosts: Steve Pearson and Rick Chapman Lead Presentation: Sean Sullivan and Chuck Phelps (risk aversion) Responders: Chris McCabe, Jason Wasfy